The International Criminal Court (ICC) investigation into Rodrigo Duterte’s “drug war” has been ongoing since 2017. Duterte served as president from 2016 to 2022 and although he withdrew the Philippines from the ICC in 2019, he remained liable for crimes committed up to 2019. Depending on how far back the court wants to go, Duterte was also mayor of Davao city in the southern Philippines from 1988. He has openly admitted to killing people himself and with his Davao Death Squad, whose extrajudicial executions are well documented.
The Hague court has called for witnesses -- somewhat naively, given the danger it may put people in. Current President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. has largely maintained the stance that he would not cooperate with the ICC investigation. But when Duterte returned on March 11 from a political rally in Hong Kong where he addressed crowds about the ICC investigation, he was arrested upon arrival in Manila.
Still not cooperating with the ICC?
President Marcos claims the country was only honouring its duties to Interpol by facilitating the execution of the ICC warrant. This line from Marcos may not stand up to scrutiny for very long. And in any case, this raises some basic questions. Why didn’t the court issue the arrest warrant years ago? Has new evidence come to light? Duterte’s responsibility for the drug war has never been in question and he has never refuted it. But he never pulled the trigger in any of the deaths, unless we go back to the Davao days. Is this the last and only throw of the dice for the ICC?
A true investigation and accountability for the victims’ families would involve a much-needed examination of the Philippines National Police (PNP) and transmitting evidence they have of the crimes. Here lies the sticking point for Marcos and those in the PNP now promoted to senior roles. If the country is still not going to cooperate with the ICC, a deep prosecution of the drug war will be impossible, and Duterte will be the only target. This will lead to accusations of a “show trial” and ultimately not serve the Philippines people very well.
Shoring up Western support
Manila finds itself in an awkward diplomatic spot. Its Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Enrique A. Manalo, was in London last week, doing the rounds to shore up western commitment to the Philippines in its increasingly fractious rivalry with China. Manalo has a difficult task in Europe right now, with attention focused on Ukraine, as well as in finding a way to navigate the new United States administration. As any career diplomat would do, he said very little and asked for nothing specific from the United Kingdom, the EU, the US or other regional allies. Instead, he portrayed the Philippines as the Far-Eastern stronghold of international law and rules-based international order. This is clearly a blatant contradiction, coming from a country that continues to maintain it is not cooperating with the ICC.
The Trump administration is desperate to refocus on China and put Gaza and Ukraine firmly as second priorities. The US has openly declared it has interest and responsibility in the Asia-Pacific region. Manalo knows that western attention and support for Manila is entirely reliant on its geopolitical use as a buffer against China. The Philippines territorial case is clear under international law, despite what China may claim, using ancient crudely drawn maps as a justification. The Hague Permanent Court of Arbitration ruled in favour of the Philippines against China in July 2016, based on the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. But China ignores the ruling, so boats are rammed, lasers and water cannons are fired, and tensions only rise.
International law, for what it is worth these days, has become a crutch for the Philippines foreign secretary to lean on in London and in Washington. And freedom of trade through the South China Sea is the only reason why western nations are backing the Philippines.
ICC doesn’t “act in the proper way”
But when I confronted Secretary Manalo with the contradiction -- if not hypocrisy – on the Philippines approach to international law, during a 18 February 2025 Chatham House conversation, he claimed the ICC doesn’t “act in the proper way”. Appealing to the populations, be they in Manila where many oppose US military influence, or in London, is the spirit of the time. Claiming legitimacy under international law is contemptuous of the public and the vitality of international law. This is not an academic point. Understanding the true nature of our allies and the binds that will be tested in times of conflict are best stressed in peacetime.
We should also recognize that the Duterte regime in Manila tried to turn its back on the West and wanted to ignore the court's South China Sea ruling. This was a regime that not only massacred its own people with impunity, but would have sold out to China if it could have secured enough in return, which Duterte couldn’t. Beijing saw him as unruly, unstable and not worth expanding its fight with the US for.
Bringing the Dutertes to heel
The current Marcos regime has used its potential cooperation with the ICC as a tool to bring the Dutertes to heel. But it seems this wasn’t enough. Rodrigo Duterte’s daughter Sarah, who is current vice-president – despite a potential impeachment for threatening to have President Marcos, his wife and others assassinated and for embezzling $8 million –, is the likely next president in 2028 unless she is barred from public office. Marcos needed a political blow to take out the entire clan. That involves multiple agencies and moving parts beyond The Hague.
Claiming to be stalwarts of international law while ignoring human rights abuses at home has sadly become an easy line for the Philippines in 2025. It is unclear if anything has fundamentally changed yet, or if there is to be cooperation with the ICC beyond the Interpol arrest. It is also unclear what international pressure has been put on Marcos and, finally, what’s next for the Duterte clan in Filipino politics.
Dr Tom Smith is the Academic Director of the Royal Air Force College and an Associate Professor of International Relations at the University of Portsmouth, UK. He focuses on conflict and human rights in the Philippines and Southeast Asia. He has been a vocal critic of the Duterte regime and advised human rights groups in the region, working with civil society, UK government and overseas governments and NGOs.
